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ZELMAN v . SIMMONS-HARRIS, 536 U.s. 639
(2002), argued 20 Feb. 2002, decided 27 June 2002
by vote of 5 to 4; Rehnquist for the Court, O'Connor
and Thomas concurring, Souter, Stevens, and
Breyer i.n dissent. As part of a plan to improve
educa tional opportunities in Cleveland, the state
of Ohio enacted legislation providing tuition aid
to low-income parents. These parents, ra ther than
send their children to the usual public school,
could make use of a state-subsidized voucher
to send their children to participating public or
private schools. In the 1999-2000 school year,
no suburban public school participated in the
program; instead, 82 percent of the participating
schools were religious and 96 percent of the
students participating in the program attended
these religiously affiliated schools.
In 1999 and 2000, a federal district judge in
the Northern District of Ohio and a divided
panel of the Sixth U.s. Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the Ohio law had the primary effect
of advanCing religion and therefore violated the
*Establishment Clause of the "First Amendment.
The Supreme Court overturned this finding,
contending that previous decisions have drawn
a "consistent distinction between government
programs that provide aid directly to religious
schools, and programs of true private choice, in
which government aid reaches religious schools
only as a result of the genuine and independent
choice of private individuals" (p. 649). It did not
matter that nea rly all students attended religiously
affiliated schools and that there were few options
available for parents who did not want to send
their child to a religio usly affiliated school. Instead,
the Court emphasized that the program was
facially "neutral in all respects toward religion"
(p. 653) and that the number of students attending
religiously affiliated schools varies from year to
year. The dissenters, in contrast, stressed these
enrollment patterns. Noting that two-thirds of the
parents participating in the program sen t their
child ren to schools that "proselytized in a religion
not their own" (p . 704), Justice David *Souter
accused the majority of "ignoring the meaning of
neutrality and private choice."
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